If you have an interest in biographical accounts of the Gulf War, you might try searching for them on the Web—and be a little surprised at the variety that exists. Most readers are well aware of Gen Norman Schwarzkopf’s It Doesn’t Take a Hero, Gen Fred Franks and Tom Clancy’s Into the Storm, Saudi prince Khaled bin Sultan’s Desert Warrior, and perhaps a couple of other broader works. But you might not know about personal accounts by Gen Chuck Horner (with Tom Clancy), naval aviators, a British special forces agent, Kuwaiti refugees, a US helicopter commander, a US Marine lieutenant, a nurse, a defense correspondent, and now an Air Force intelligence officer. Dismissing the addition of Ally to Adversary to this wide group would be a mistake—especially for Air Force officers and students of warfare—for it offers both an engaging front-row account and a rich source of perspective not found elsewhere.

A career Air Force intelligence officer and Arabic linguist, Lt Col Rick Francona had assignments to Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war and as General Schwarzkopf’s personal interpreter during the Gulf War. In those roles, he formed relationships with Iraqi military officers and worked with representatives of all the Arab partners in the coalition. More importantly, he briefed the military strategy for Schwarzkopf in Washington, Jordan, and to the Saudi king; later, he attended the controversial cease-fire negotiations. Finally, he had an intimate knowledge of US and coalition intelligence and played a direct role in efforts that are debated even today.

This is the type of book that can be read quickly, even in one sitting. Francona is articulate, and his prose grabs the reader with a personal flair and touch. He begins with background to the war: his experience in Iraq during the mid and late 1980s and the year leading up to Iraq’s incursion into Kuwait. He then relates his experiences serving as an interpreter, working with the Saudis, seeing the coalition structure developed, and briefing the military strategies to US and Arab audiences. He spends most of his pages on wartime insights and experiences, from airpower planning and execution, to concerns with Israel and Scud hunting, to searches for captured newsmen, to the ground war and Safwan negotiations. He wraps up with observations about the aftermath and the author’s participation in postwar Pentagon reporting.

Other than the broad insights one might gain, four areas make this book extremely valuable for the military reader. First is Francona’s descriptions and accounts of the Arab perspective. He not only provides a more balanced view of the Iraqis’ perception of the war, but also effectively outlines what many in the United States would find incomprehensible: incidents such as Saudi officers cheering in control centers upon hearing of Iraqi Scuds hitting Israel. People may have heard the aphorism “the enemy of my enemy is my friend,” but Francona’s anecdotes make it more understandable and a real aid to assimilating aspects of Arab culture. More importantly, the author’s descriptions of Arab perspectives on Gulf events fill a critical gap in most of the Gulf War literature, which ignores or downplays the roles and viewpoints of our coalition partners.

A second contribution is the author’s observations on two wide debates about personalities: Schwarzkopf versus Prince Khaled and Schwarz-kopf versus his US commanders. Rather than providing mere opinion, Francona relates incidents that allow readers to draw their own conclusions about Schwarzkopf’s infamous temper and the working relationship with Khaled and other members of the coalition. One such incident that is also found in both Schwarzkopf’s and Khaled’s books concerns an alleged suggestion by the Arabs for the main attack to come from Turkey; Francona provides recollections that support the US commander. As regards the coalition commander’s working relationship with his own US subordinates, Francona is neither apologetic nor disrespectful—readers will probably be struck by the honest and realistic accounts of personality conflicts bounded by professional duties. Although he does not directly address the criticisms and clashes between Schwarzkopf and Franks that one finds in Into the Storm, Francona does a competent and thorough job exploring the air and ground war “balance.” Clearly, in the author’s view, the ground war was best described as the “mother of all prisoner roundups.”

A third issue of critical interest to military readers is the Safwan negotiations. Historians would be remiss if they did not incorporate the two chapters devoted to these events into critical reviews of the war. Francona’s history is personal—he was there—and very engaging. His command to the Iraqi general to “get out of the car, a- -h- - -” is a classic picture of what was going on. He also cuts through some controversies, from the confusion about whether the Safwan meetings were cease-fire talks or actual war-termination negotiations (they were supposed to be the former, in Schwarzkopf’s view), to the Iraqis’ ignorance of their own state of affairs (their representatives were stunned when presented with evidence of the destruction of their forces). He paints the decision to allow the Iraqis use of helicopters as more exploitation of a loophole than US ignorance or command errors. Typically, though, Francona details the events and allows readers to draw their own conclusions.

The fourth and final issue needs little description but should be emphasized: Francona is clearly an experienced intelligence officer and an airpower advocate. Intelligence officers will find in his account numerous anecdotes and substantial advice about how their discipline both makes mistakes and saves lives. Again, he is not an apologist, so pilots and commanders will also find a wealth of firsthand perspective about the strengths and weaknesses of US intelligence practice. Taken as a whole, the book highlights the interface between intelligence and airpower operations; moreover, Francona seems (rightfully) concerned that the United States may not be investing enough in the human-intelligence field to reap the benefits it can provide.

I should emphasize that Ally to Adversary is not a history of the Gulf War; nor is it an “I was there and won the war” account. It is a personal history of an intelligence officer active in many of the most critical events, one which greatly complements broader accounts of planning and execution or analyses of leadership and command. If you are interested in the Gulf War, it is more valuable than nine out of 10 of any of the personal accounts; if you are an Air Force officer or other professional, it provides extremely valuable insights on airpower, command, and intelligence. Read it for yourself, and see if you agree.

Lt Col Jon A. Kimminau, USAF
Columbus, Ohio

Disclaimer - The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.